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Abstract 
Europe’s monetary union is part of a broader process of integration that started in the aftermath 
of World War II. In this “political guide for economists” we look at the creation of the euro 
within the bigger picture of European integration. How and why were European institutions 
established? What are the goals and determinants of European Integration? What is European 
integration really about? We address these questions from a political-economy perspective, 
building on ideas and results from the economic literature on the formation of states and 
political unions. Specifically, we look at the motivations, assumptions, and limitations of the 
European strategy, initiated by Jean Monnet and his collaborators, of partially integrating 
policy functions in a few areas, with the expectation that more integration will follow in other 
areas, in a sort of chain reaction towards an “ever-closer union.” The euro with its current 
problems is a child of that strategy and its limits.  
 
 
*Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Jeff Frieden, Yannis Ioannides, Deborah Menegotto, 
Stelios Michalopoulos, Romain Wacziarg, and the editors of the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives (David Autor, Chang-Tai Hseih, and Tim Taylor) for their detailed comments. I 
also benefited from helpful feedback and conversations with many people, including Lorenzo 
Bini-Smaghi, Giancarlo Corsetti, Henrik Enderlein, Kai Konrad, Athanasios Orphanides, Lucas 
Papademos, and Daniela Schwarzer, and participants in the political economy discussion group 
at Harvard and a conference at the Condorcet Center for Political Economy in Rennes. Of course 
I am the only one responsible for all opinions and errors in this paper. 
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As an economic and financial crisis unfolds across the European Union, critics argue that 
European institutional integration has gone too far, blame misguided political motivations, 
and assert that the monetary union has failed (for example, Feldstein 2012). On the other 
side, supporters of European integration attribute the euro crisis to institutional 
incompleteness—what Bergsten (2012) called a “half-built house.” They argue that the 
solution to Europe’s woes should be sought in additional integration: a banking union, a 
fiscal union, or perhaps even a full political union and the formation of a federation. 
  
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2004, p. 1), the economist and central banker who played a key 
role in the birth of the euro, wrote: “[T]he euro was the result of a long-term development 
that started in the aftermath of World War II. After experiencing political oppression and war 
in the first half of the twentieth century, Europe undertook to build a new order for peace, 
freedom, and prosperity.  Despite its predominantly economic content, the European Union 
is an eminently political construct. Even readers primarily interested in economics would 
hardly understand the euro if they ignored its political dimension.”   
 
This political guide for economists takes a step back and looks at the creation of the euro 
within the bigger picture of European integration. How and why were European institutions 
established? What is European integration really about?  
 
The history of European integration is complicated, with a big cast of actors including 
governments, technocrats, interest groups, and voters, who in turn pursue a range of 
economic and political goals. This complexity is reflected in a variety of interpretations by 
political scientists and political economists (for overviews, see Gilpin 2001, chapter 13; 
Eichengreen 2006; and Sadeh and Verdun 2009). This article discusses facts and theories 
about European integration from a political-economy perspective, building on ideas and 
results from the economic literature on the formation of states and political union (for 
overviews, see Spolaore 2006, 2012). Specifically, we look at the motivations, assumptions, 
and limitations of the European strategy of partially integrating policy functions in a few 
areas, with the expectation that more integration will follow in other areas, in a sort of chain 
reaction towards an “ever-closer union.” The euro with its current problems is a child of that 
strategy and its limits.  
 
A European Federation? 
 
The idea of a new sovereign federation across Europe goes back a long time, but it received a 
big push from the first half of the twentieth century. At the end of World War II, the 
promoters of European integration looked back at the previous decades and saw a continent 
fragmented in independent and unconstrained nation states, which had pursed costly beggar-
thy-neighbor policies during the Great Depression and engaged in two major wars. The goal 
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of European integration was to create a system where nation states would no longer follow 
such unilateral and destructive policies.  
In 1943 a group led by Altiero Spinelli founded the European Federalist Movement. In 1946, 
Winston Churchill argued for the creation of “the United States of Europe” (which in his 
view did not include Britain). By definition, a federation would have eliminated national 
borders and international conflict (but not civil conflict) among Europeans. However, no 
European federation was created immediately after World War II. 
Instead, the founding document of European integration is the Schuman declaration of May 
9, 1950, named after France’s foreign minister Robert Schuman and inspired by Jean 
Monnet, a businessman and civil servant who played a crucial role in starting European 
institutions in the following years. The declaration proposed that “Franco-German 
production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within 
the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe.” 
The plan was motivated by security, as a way “to make it plain that any war between France 
and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.” The pooling of 
coal and steel production was ambitiously defined as “a first step in the federation of 
Europe.” 
The Schumann declaration led in 1951 to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
among six countries.1 The ECSC was then used as the institutional template for two proposed 
communities: the European Defense Community and the European Political Community, 
which included the formation of a common army, a common budget, and common 
institutions with significant legislative and executive powers. It would have basically 
amounted to a European federation (Moravcsik 1998; Rector 2009). A treaty was signed 
among the six countries in 1952 but failed to obtain ratification in the French parliament, and 
never took effect. In 1955 several politicians, including Jean Monnet, created an “Action 
Committee for the United States of Europe.” But, again, no United States of Europe actually 
formed.2 
 
The fundamental reasons behind these failures to form a federation have bedeviled the 
supporters of a United States of Europe, then and since. There are two issues which are key 
to understanding the beginning of the integration process, its setbacks, and the following path 
of European integration. One issue is a general problem in political economy: the trade-off 
between costs and benefits when heterogeneous groups are politically integrated under a 
                                                            
1 France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. 
2 Subsequent less ambitious attempts to integrate European defense and foreign policy have not been very successful either. For 
instance, see Alesina and Perotti (2004) for a critical discussion of the more recent experience of the European Union in these and 
other areas. 
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common authority. The other issue involves the particular role of Germany, the country that 
played a central role in World Wars I and II.  
 
The Political Economy of Heterogeneous Populations 
The formation of a European federation across heterogeneous populations, which share 
diverse social and economic structures, languages, cultures and identities, would come with 
several benefits but also with high costs. The trade-off between such costs and benefits is 
central to the political feasibility and stability of institutional integration among those 
populations (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). 
Potential benefits from full political unification include economies of scale in the provision 
of federal public goods, such as defense and security, and the ability to internalize positive 
and negative externalities over a large area. A European federation with its own budget and 
redistribution policies could also provide insurance against asymmetric shocks that only 
affect some of its regions, whether natural, like an earthquake, or man-made, like the 
bursting of a housing bubble. These benefits from fiscal federalism are often stressed when 
comparing Europe to the United States (for example, Sala-i-Martin and Sachs 1992; 
Krugman 2012), and are now at the forefront of the debate about the European sovereign 
debt crisis (Lane 2012).  
However, political unification comes with significant costs when various groups speak 
different languages, share different cultural norms and identities, and have different 
preferences for public policies and institutions that cannot be decentralized at the sub-federal 
level (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). Among those institutions is the ultimate “public 
good”: the federal government itself, with all its constitutional and legal traits, policies, 
official language(s), and so on, about which German or Dutch people may have very 
different views from those prevalent in France or Italy. 
A growing literature has explored the links between measures of heterogeneity and political 
outcomes, such as the provision of public goods, the extent of redistribution, the quality of 
government, and the likelihood of civil and international conflict. Microeconomic evidence 
links ethnic heterogeneity to underprovision of public goods at the local level (Alesina and 
La Ferrara 2005). There is also macroeconomic evidence of negative correlations between 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization and government performance, although causality and 
robustness are less clear-cut (Alesina et al. 2003). In addition, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005) and Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) find that ethnolinguistic polarization is 
associated with civil conflict. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Weber (2009) show that once 
distances between languages are accounted for, linguistic diversity has a significant negative 
effect on redistribution. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2012) find that deep linguistic 
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distances are good predictors of civil conflict and redistribution, while even finer distinctions 
between languages, such as those among different dialects, matter for economic growth and 
public goods provision. The bottom line of this literature is that measures of ethnic, 
linguistic, and cultural diversity have significant effects on policy outcomes, redistribution, 
and the provision of public goods. A European federation would be quite heterogeneous by 
most of these measures, and likely to face significant political costs when choosing common 
public goods and policies at the federal level.3  
The example of defense and security – which played a fundamental role in Europe’s early 
attempts to integrate - can serve to illustrate these issues.  These are public goods with high 
economies of scale, but also high heterogeneity costs stemming from diverse preferences 
across populations. Military power has historically been a central tool to ensure a 
government’s monopoly of legitimate use of coercion over a territory. Integration of defense 
and security under one authority usually goes hand in hand with the centralization of this 
monopoly of coercion – that is, with the formation of a sovereign state or federation (Alesina 
and Spolaore 2003). However, different populations with different histories, cultures and 
identities are likely to disagree over the type of government in charge of such a federation. 
Moreover, coercion can then be used to collect taxes, finance a larger set of other public 
goods and redistribute resources across different groups. This redistribution is more likely to 
be resisted when groups are different not only economically but also along ethnic and 
linguistic lines. For instance, Western Germans may be more willing (or less unwilling) to 
redistribute resources to Eastern Germans than to Greeks or Italians. Consequently, 
centralized provision of defense and security across large and diverse populations usually 
takes place when dictatorial rulers are able to ignore the heterogeneity costs of the 
populations they conquer, and/or when there are overwhelming benefits of scale from 
defense that offset high heterogeneity costs (Alesina and Spolaore 2005, 2006). The two 
most successful federal republics, Switzerland and the United States, emerged in response to 
external security threats, and the unification of Germany in the nineteenth century resulted 
from conquest by Prussia (Riker 1964; Gilpin 2001). 
 
Military and political union is not the only way to deal with security threats. Heterogeneous 
sovereign states can benefit from economies of scale in defense by forming military 
alliances, while still maintaining their political and fiscal independence. But military 
alliances, where each state can autonomously decide its own level of military spending and 
pay for it, can lead to undersupply of defense from the perspective of the whole alliance 
because of free riding (for a discussion, Spolaore 2012). Western Europeans failed to form a 
                                                            
3
Fractionalization is maximized when each individual belongs to a different group, while polarization is maximized when there 
are only two large groups of equal size. A larger European federation formed by many groups would be more fractionalized but 
less polarized than a smaller federation dominated by a couple of groups (e.g., Germans and French). 
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federation even when faced with an existential threat from the Soviet Union, and relied 
instead on an international alliance (NATO), where issues of undersupply and free riding 
were in part addressed by the dominant role of the United States.  
If heterogeneity can explain failures to integrate in the past, does it need to be an obstacle to 
future political integration? Over time, couldn’t a federal Europe change political and social 
interactions and affect cultures and identities among Europeans, leading to a shared identity 
within a “European nation”? After all, nineteenth century France famously turned “peasants 
into Frenchmen” through public policies and modernization (Weber 1976).  
This question is part of the broader debate on the persistent political and economic effects of 
historical and cultural traits, and the extent that culture itself can be changed by policies and 
institutions (for recent discussions, Bisin and Verdier 2010; Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013).4 
In the long run, people can learn new languages, modify their cultural traits and identities, 
and transmit different traits to their children in response to changing incentives, including 
public policies. However, it is at best a gamble to hope that political integration of modern 
democratic nations will lead to cultural integration.  Historically, nation-building and 
attempts to “homogenize” populations were implemented by rulers of undemocratic societies 
who had an interest at reducing heterogeneity costs in order to maximize their own rents 
(Alesina and Spolaore 2003, pp. 76-78) or pursue their own preferences (Alesina and Reich 
2013). Realistic supporters of European integration understand that convergence of political 
preferences through reduction of linguistic and cultural barriers, if it is going to occur at all, 
will be a slow and gradual process, which should take place naturally and consensually.  
For Europeans, heterogeneity has been a source of benefits as well as of costs. When people 
have different preferences and traits, societies can benefit economically and culturally 
through specialization, learning, and exchange of goods and services, as well as ideas and 
innovations. Benefits from heterogeneity, however, are mostly about interactions over rival 
goods, not public goods, which are non-rival. Similar preferences over the same rival goods 
can lead closely related groups to conflict and war (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2012), while 
different preferences over rival goods can facilitate peaceful exchanges and a better 
allocation of resources. In contrast, diverse preference over public goods, like a federation’s 
government, laws, and public policies, will be much harder to reconcile because one kind 
must apply to everyone within the federation, whether everyone likes it or not. As a result, 
heterogeneity of preferences is mostly beneficial when people interact about rival goods but 
costly when sharing non-rival goods. This is an important reason why, as we will see, the 
European project has been much more successful when fostering economic exchanges and a 
                                                            
4 There is also an extensive political literature debating whether the social and political relevance of ethnic and linguistic 
divisions can be altered by politics and institutional change (for a discussion, Fearon 2006).    
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common market, while it has stalled when attempting to pool “federal” public goods, such as 
defense and security. 
The Role of Germany 
In hindsight, as we look back at the 1952 treaty that would have established a European 
Defense Community and a European Political Community, what’s perhaps more surprising is 
not that France rejected it, but that the other states ratified the treaty. A reason is that the 
other two largest states at that time, West Germany and Italy, had just emerged from a severe 
military defeat, and faced significant constraints to their own defense and foreign policy. 
West Germany was the more extreme case: a divided country, technically under military 
occupation until 1955. In those circumstances, the costs of constraints on German 
sovereignty by pooling defense and security were low and could be traded against other 
political and economic benefits. As Germany’s status as a sovereign state “normalized” over 
time, its incentives to join a security-based federal union decreased.  
The agreement for a European Coal and Steel Community is often interpreted from a similar 
perspective. According to Milward (1984), France proposed the coal and steel community to 
constrain German control of its own industry, in response to U.S. plans in 1949 to allow a 
Germany relatively free of allied supervision. Germany agreed to the Schuman plan because, 
by sharing management of its coal and steel, it could obtain important concessions, such as 
“the removal of ceilings on permissible levels of industrial production” (Eichengreen 2006, 
p, 802). According to Berger and Ritschl (1995), French access to German coal was “the 
most important element of the Monnet Plan for France's reconstruction.”  
 
These examples illustrate a continuing issue in the history and politics of European 
integration: the extent to which European supranational institutions can be interpreted as 
tools to constrain German power in the interest of its neighbors, especially France. This 
theme has come to the forefront again with the creation of the euro. A popular view is that 
giving up its currency was the price that Germany had to pay to overcome France’s 
opposition to German reunification (Garrett, 1993; Marsh 2011), a deal summarized by the 
witticism quoted by Garton Ash (2012, p. 6): “[T]he whole of Deutschland for Kohl, half the 
deutsche mark for Mitterrand.” Literally taken, as a quid pro quo, this interpretation is not 
held by most scholars (Sadeh and Verdun 2009). It is questionable that a French threat to 
veto the reunification of Germany could be credible. Moreover, key decisions about the 
single currency had already been taken before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and 
German politicians and interest groups (like exporters) had other strong reasons to favor a 
monetary union (Moravcsik 1998; Frieden 2002).  
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However, it is not fully coincidental that the implementation of the euro took place during 
and right after German reunification and the opening of political and economic relations 
between Western and Eastern Europe. Germany’s chancellor at that time, Helmut Kohl, 
viewed the euro as a big step in the broader process of European integration, which he 
considered essential to reassure Germany’s neighbors about his enlarged country’s 
commitments to peace, security, and economic cooperation (Garton Ash 2012).  And even 
though the process leading to economic and monetary union had started before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, a detailed analysis of the interactions among key participants in the negotiations 
show that German reunification led to a reassessment of the relative payoffs from economic 
and monetary union, and was used “to reshape […] negotiations” (Dyson and Featherstone 
1999, p. 16).  
 
The increase in Germany’s potential power might also have affected the borders of the future 
euro area, making it much larger than predicted by efficiency criteria, such as the theory of 
Optimum Currency Areas. For example, Eichengreen (2012, p. 125) mentions the view that 
France and others pushed for the inclusion of many countries at the “periphery,” like 
Southern Mediterranean countries, to “balance” Germany’s larger size and influence within 
the monetary union. 
 
Whether these Realpolitik interpretations are fully persuasive, the French government saw a 
close link between German reunification and European integration. According to an adviser 
to the French President, "Mitterrand did not want [German] reunification without advances 
toward greater European integration, and the currency was the only topic that was open to 
debate" (Spiegel, 2010).  
 
How had a monetary issue become “the next step” in the process of European integration? 
What was (and is) such a process about? To answer these questions we need to go back to 
what happened after the rejection of the defense and political communities in the mid-1950s. 
 
From the Common Market to Economic and Monetary Union: Jean Monnet’s Chain 
Reaction? 
From the successful creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the rejection of 
the European Defense Community, Jean Monnet and the other supporters of European 
integration learned a lesson in political realism (Duchêne 1994). Partial integration in 
narrowly defined areas, such as coal and steel, was feasible, while more ambitious 
integration in broader areas such as defense and policy coordination would meet too much 
political opposition. Their next step was the creation in 1957 of a community similar to 
ECSC for civilian atomic energy (EURATOM), and, more importantly, a European 
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Economic Community (EEC) to set up a customs union: the “common market.” The 
institutions of the three communities were later merged and became known as the European 
Community. The treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Lisbon (2009) reorganized and replaced 
the European Community with the European Union.  
The Treaty of Rome of 1957 establishing the European common market no longer referred to 
steps “toward a federation,” but included the vaguer objective of laying the “foundations of 
an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.”5 The signatories’ main stated goal was 
“to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate 
the barriers which divide Europe,” while claiming that this would strengthen peace and 
security. To foster those goals, European states created two sets of institutions: supranational 
institutions such as the European Commission, Parliament, and Court of Justice, and 
intergovernmental institutions, such as the Council of Ministers and, later, the European 
Council, formed by the heads of state or government of the member states.  
Over time, policy functions have been delegated to European institutions in an increasing 
range of areas. Nonetheless, national governments have kept control over fundamental 
decisions, and must decide unanimously on all changes to the international treaties that set 
Europe’s informal “constitution.” An attempt to establish a formal “Constitution for Europe” 
failed when it was rejected by French and Dutch voters in 2005.  
The history of European integration reflects this tension between the role of supranational 
institutions and the power of national governments. The conflict is also mirrored by the two 
most influential political theories about European integration: functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. This terminology is rather confusing for the uninitiated.6 In a nutshell, 
the theories are distinguished by how they answer the question: who is in charge of European 
integration?  
Intergovernmentalists believe that national governments are in charge, and that supranational 
institutions are tools of the national states, which use them to pursue their own goals. 
Moravcsik (1993, 1998), an influential proponent of this theory, believes that national 
governments have built European institutions in order to pursue the economic interests of 
their domestic constituencies. In this spirit, Moravcsik (2012) views the euro as an economic 
gamble, mostly reflecting the interests of powerful national producers. This interpretation fits 
within a broader literature emphasizing the link from domestic economic interests to national 
attitudes and policies towards European integration (for example, Frieden 1998, 2002). The 
                                                            
5
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf 
6  The jargon is furthermore complicated by “neo” prefixes and other qualifications. Haas (1958,1964), the father of the 
functionalist approach to European integration, called his theory “neo-functionalism,” to distinguish it from a previous theory of 
international cooperation developed by David Mitrany. Moravcsik (1993, 1998) calls his approach “liberal 
intergovernmentalism” to distinguish it from “realist” theories that also place national states at the center of the analysis, but 
emphasize power and interstate rivalry rather than domestic economic interests. In this article I only use the simpler terms.  
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political-economy approach to regional integration based on domestic economic interests is 
familiar to the economics profession, and therefore I will not say more here. I will focus 
instead on the alternative theory of functionalism, which is much less known among 
economists, even though it has played a significant role in the ideology and practice of 
European integration and the creation of the euro. 
 
Functionalists believe that European integration is not primarily driven by national 
governments and their voters, but mostly pushed by elites and interest groups that transcend 
national boundaries. They stress the role of supranational entrepreneurs and civil servants 
like Jean Monnet in the 1950s and Jacques Delors in the 1980s and 1990s. The theory is 
called “functionalism” because it is about the dynamic effects of transferring specific 
“functions” to supranational institutions – for example, regulation of coal and steel 
production to the European Coal and Steel Community or monetary policy to the European 
Central Bank.  Although this integration starts in economic areas, integration in one area may 
well lead to further integration in many other areas, not only economic but also political 
(Haas 1958, 1964; Pierson 1996; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). In sum, while 
intergovernmentalists believe that European integration is rooted in the pursuit of national 
economic interests, functionalists believe that it is about economic integration as a path 
towards political integration. 
 
The theory of functionalism was directly inspired by Jean Monnet’s strategy to delegate 
specific functions to supranational institutions in relatively narrow areas, mostly technical 
and economic, with the expectation that it would lead to more institutional integration in 
other areas over time. Functionalists believe that moving only some policy functions to the 
supranational level, while leaving other functions at the national level, creates pressure for 
more integration through positive and negative mechanisms. A positive mechanism would 
work through learning: as politicians and interest groups observe the benefits of integrating a 
few functions, they will want more. This idea is implicit in the Schumann declaration, stating 
“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through 
concrete achievements.” Another positive mechanism is assumed to work by changing 
people’s preferences. As groups cooperate on specific functions, barriers to communication 
and interaction would decline, which would bring an “endogenous” convergence of values 
and norms and a demand for more integration.  This rather optimistic outlook was inspired 
by Karl Deutsch’s (1964) influential research on communication theory and political 
integration. 
 
A darker mechanism through which partial integration could lead to more integration is, 
paradoxically, by generating problems and crises. Because integration is only partial, 
important complementary functions are missing at each step. For the functionalists, such 
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incompleteness is not a bug but a feature, because it creates pressure for further integration. 
Monnet’s method was explained by his collaborator George Ball (1994, p. 10):  
 
“There was a well-conceived method in this apparent madness. All of us working 
with Jean Monnet well understood how irrational it was to carve a limited economic 
sector out of the jurisdiction of national governments and subject that sector to the 
sovereign control of supranational institutions. Yet, with his usual perspicacity, 
Monnet recognized that the very irrationality of this scheme might provide the 
pressure to achieve exactly what he wanted - the triggering of a chain reaction. The 
awkwardness and complexity resulting from the singling out of coal and steel would 
drive member governments to accept the idea of pooling other production as well.” 
 
A challenge for this story is to explain why national politicians don’t anticipate Monnet’s 
chain reaction. Implicit assumptions here are that integration is irreversible, and that national 
politicians or voters would prefer limited integration to either more integration or no 
integration. But then, if politicians see that limited integration will lead to more integration, 
they should either agree to the outcome of more integration right away, or they should object 
to starting the process at all. What factors could allow elites and supranational technocrats to 
move ahead with initiatives leading to outcomes that national politicians or voters would not 
have approved in advance? A first possible explanation proposed by functionalists is that 
national politicians have short horizons: they approve the first step, but do not care about the 
next steps. A second explanation is asymmetric information. The initial steps of functional 
integration are taken in narrow and technical areas, such as coal and steel in the 1950s or, 
later, anti-trust regulations and monetary issues. In those matters, national politicians and 
voters are much less informed than technocrats, political elites, and supranational 
entrepreneurs. Hence, it is difficult for them to monitor these agents and anticipate the 
consequences of their actions (Pierson 1996; see Eichengreen 2006 for a discussion). A third, 
even less flattering reason why the mechanism may work is that European supranational 
institutions and bureaucracies have been set up (on purpose?) with little democratic 
accountability—the so-called “democratic deficit”—reducing the opportunities of national 
voters to monitor the technocrats (for a discussion, Alesina and Spolaore 2003, chapter 12).   
Functionalism was the dominant theory of European integration in the 1950s and 1960s, then 
came to seem less plausible (Haas 1975) following a series of political setbacks to 
integration. A major setback was the “Empty Chair Crisis,” when French President Charles 
de Gaulle boycotted European institutions because he objected to their plans for more 
supranational integration. The crisis was resolved in a truly “intergovernmentalist” way with 
the Luxembourg compromise of 1966, in which de facto veto power was given to every 
member state on issues of “very important national interest.” However, the functionalist view 
11 
 
returned in fashion with the revival of European integration in the 1980s and 1990s when 
Jacques Delors was head of the European Commission. Functionalism continues to be very 
influential not only academically but also among European policy-makers and supranational 
civil servants (perhaps not surprisingly, given that they play the main role according to the 
theory). 
In 1992 the members of the European Community signed a Treaty on European Union at 
Maastricht, which reorganized European institutions and designed an Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU),7 establishing the institutional foundations for the euro. Jacques 
Delors and his Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, also known as 
the “Delors Committee,” played a crucial role, as documented in a detailed analysis of the 
negotiations leading to the economic and monetary union (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999). 
The design and rationale for the European economic and monetary union, as laid out in 
official documents and studies (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 
1989; Commission of the European Communities, 1990), was deeply influenced by the 
functionalist view of European integration (Sadeh and Verdun 2009, p. 283). 
An important functionalist argument was based on the “inconsistent quartet:” the mutual 
incompatibility of free trade, mobility of capital, fixed exchange rates, and independence of 
national monetary policies (Padoa-Schioppa 2004). Assuming that fixed exchange rates were 
essential for Europe’s single market, then moving from commercial integration to 
liberalization of capital movements had to lead to the loss of national monetary autonomy.8 
In fact, Padoa-Schioppa (2004, p. 14), one of the architects of the economic and monetary 
union and key member of the Delors Committee, explained the path to the euro in terms that 
explicitly echoed the chain-reaction metaphor:  
“[T]he road toward the single currency looks like a chain reaction in which each step 
resolved a preexisting contradiction and generated a new one that in turn required a 
further step forward. The steps were the start of the EMS [European monetary 
system] (1979), the re-launching of the single market (1985), the decision to 
accelerate the liberalization of capital movements (1986), the launching of the project 
of monetary union (1988), the agreement of Maastricht (1992), and the final adoption 
of the euro (1998).”  
                                                            
7 “EMU” is a confusing acronym. It does not stay for “European Monetary Union” (a widespread and understandable confusion). 
Instead, it means “Economic and Monetary Union,” including both the monetary union and the single market (for the official 
definition, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/emu/). In the 1990s, some even referred to EMU as short-hand for the 
whole Maastricht agreement, which included several other provisions besides those about economic and monetary union. In 
contrast, many now use EMU in a narrower sense, only for the monetary union. Given such ambiguities, I avoid the acronym 
EMU and spell out “economic and monetary union” whenever possible in this article. 
8 Fixed exchange rates were viewed as essential for free trade within Europe not only for economic reasons, but also and perhaps 
chiefly for political reasons, because of the fear that competitive devaluations could trigger a protectionist policy reaction by 
other member states, leading to the eventual unraveling of the single market (Eichengreen and Frieden 2001, pp. 12-13). 
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Also, in the functionalist tradition, each step in this chain reaction was viewed as irreversible. 
A joke attributed to Padoa-Schioppa refers to how EMU, the economic and monetary union, 
like the Australian bird with the same name, could not walk backward. 
Not only was the path to the euro explained in functionalist terms from a technical 
perspective, but was also viewed, in Schumann and Monnet’s tradition, as “a further step—
and as a prerequisite for yet other steps—in the political unification of Europe” (Padoa-
Schioppa 2004, p. 6). Wim Duisenberg, the first President of the European Central Bank, 
said (as quoted in Van Overtveldt 2011, p. 63): “EMU is, and was always meant to be a 
stepping stone on the way to a united Europe.” German Chancellor Helmut Kohl famously 
said in 1991 (as quoted in Marsh 2011, p. 301): "It is absurd to expect in the long run that 
you can maintain economic and monetary union without political union." 
From the perspective of Monnet’s method, such an “absurd” economic and monetary union 
without political union should create pressures for still more integration. The euro area 
lacked many institutions historically associated with a successful monetary union: for 
example, a central bank that could really act as market maker and lender of last resort, a 
banking union, and a fiscal union. But this incompleteness could be rationalized as a natural 
and unavoidable feature of partial integration in the functionalist tradition. Even though 
present political constraints prevented the immediate implementation of a more 
comprehensive design, the launching of an “incomplete” monetary union would set the steps 
for further integration in due course, as predicted by functionalist theories. For example, 
people would learn with time about the large benefits from economic and monetary union 
and ask for more integration in other areas. Also, supporters of the euro embraced two 
arguments mirroring the long-standing functionalist view that preferences and behavior 
endogenously converge following integration. One argument was that regions become 
economically more homogeneous after they share a common currency (Frankel and Rose 
1998).9 Secondly, the economic and monetary union was supposed to provide discipline to 
governments, including those that used to pursue erratic policies. As a result, all member 
states would eventually converge to common values and policies emphasizing 
macroeconomic stability. Supranational institutions could provide the necessary sanctions if 
national governments deviated from agreed rules of stability. No-bailout rules would also be 
enforced. If, in spite of these positive effects and precautions, future crises were to occur, 
they could be resolved with more institutional integration. 
Assuming that such logic could really work – and events of the last few years certainly sound 
a skeptical note - where would Monnet’s chain reaction lead to in the long run? Jean Monnet 
himself was ambiguous about his long-term vision of European integration (Hoffmann 1966; 
                                                            
9 In contrast, the anti-functionalist argument that integration can lead to specialization and more heterogeneity (Krugman and 
Venables, 1996) received much less attention in Brussels. 
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Duchêne 1994). He oscillated between two visions. One was the original federalist dream of 
the United States of Europe, in which Europe was an “incomplete federation” to be 
completed. The other vision was of a “post-modern” world where traditional sovereign 
states, including classic federations like the United States of America, would play a marginal 
role compared to supranational institutions and norms, which would represent a novel way to 
organize interdependence among individuals and groups: Europe as a “post-federation.” This 
same ambiguity is present in the conflicting views about the euro among its supporters: is it a 
currency without a state yet, or is it a currency without a state ever? 
The Limits to Monnet’s Chain Reaction 
Since the Schumann declaration of 1950 which launched the Monnet strategy of partial 
integration, European institutions have grown from a coal and steel community of six 
countries to a European Union of 28 countries (as of summer 2013), building along the way a 
customs union, a single market, an economic and monetary union, and much more. This list 
of achievements has brought several benefits, to which we will return. Nonetheless, the 
“functionalist” view, deeply embodied in the ideology and practice of the European Union, 
that each step is part of a chain reaction leading to ever closer integration has serious 
limitations. 
As a starting point, the functionalist emphasis on the rising power and autonomy of 
supranational institutions compared to national governments must be taken with a grain of 
salt. National governments do agree to delegate responsibilities to supranational institutions 
as commitment devices to achieve collective goals which are in each government’s long-term 
interest. To be credible, those institutions must have some autonomous power and 
independence; the rules for the autonomy of the European Central Bank come to mind. In 
addition, as in all complex organizations, supranational agents cannot be perfectly monitored 
by their principals (in this case, national governments and voters), and some principal-agent 
slack always exist. However, none of this means that Europe’s supranational institutions can 
go very far against the ultimate interests of national governments. While supranational 
institutions and procedures are important in the day-by-day working of Europe, they “could 
not work for a week in the absence of the will to cooperate of the member states, especially 
the largest ones – Germany and France above all” (Gilbert  2012, p. 3).  
A well-known illustration of how centralized discipline does not work when ultimate power 
is in the hands of sovereign governments is the spectacular failure of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, which came into force in the late 1990s and included mechanisms to ensure 
that member states would hold their annual budget deficits below 3 percent of GDP and their 
accumulated government debt below 60 percent of GDP. The Stability and Growth Pact was 
never credible, and became moot after 2003, when France and Germany used their political 
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power to prevent sanctions against their own violation of the pact’s fiscal rules. In general, 
the success of supranational agents’ ability to take autonomous decisions can only be 
sustained in matters where the extent of disagreement among national governments over 
policy outcomes is relatively low, like the enforcement of trade liberalization agreements. 
But success in those areas does not imply that supranational institutions and rules could also 
trump national institutions and rules in other areas with much higher heterogeneity of 
preferences and interests, like fiscal policies.  
The role of the European Court of Justice is instructive. In a series of landmark cases, the 
Court enunciated the doctrine that European Community norms have direct effect in member 
states and trump domestic law, and that individuals can directly invoke European law before 
national and European courts. For example, the 1963 case of Van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (26/62) was decided in favor of a Dutch importer 
of German chemical products that had objected to a tariff charged by the Dutch authorities in 
violation of article 12 of the Treaty of Rome, which forbids member states from raising 
customs duties between themselves or introducing new ones. The aggressive interpretation of 
its role by the European Court of Justice in this and other cases went beyond the legal 
framework that had been formally agreed with the Treaty of Rome, and, according to some 
scholars, brought Europe close to a federal system from a legal perspective (Weiler 1991; 
Krasner 1999), expanding supranational powers beyond the control of national governments 
(Pierson 1996; Stone Sweet 2000). However, these new legal doctrines were established to 
enforce norms consistent with national governments’ own collective objectives, such as trade 
liberalization. The acceptance of these decisions by national governments and courts did not 
imply that any European norms would be as easily accepted in the future. In more recent 
years the German Constitutional Court has elaborated the legal theory of conditional 
acceptance of European Union norms, according to which Germany only accepts the 
supremacy of EU law insofar as it is consistent with fundamental German rights. In a famous 
decision on the constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty (BVerfGE 89,155 of October 12, 
1993), the German Court ruled that there is a legal limit to the powers of EU norms, defined 
by their effects on national democratic sovereignty. In a landmark ruling on the Lisbon 
Treaty (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of June 6, 2009), the German Court explicitly stated that the 
national states are “the masters of the treaties,” and "therefore must see to it that there are no 
uncontrolled, independent centralization dynamics" within the EU (quoted in Spiegel, 2009), 
a clear and explicit brake on functionalist dynamics. 
In general, the central problem with the chain-reaction method is the unwarranted 
expectation that gradual integration, which has been successful in low-heterogeneity-costs 
areas, can continue unabated when moving to areas with much higher heterogeneity costs. 
This problem stems from the lack of a realistic assessment of the increasing costs and 
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constraints imposed by heterogeneity of preferences. Successful integration is more likely to 
take off in areas such as commercial integration, where heterogeneity costs are relatively 
low, and partly offset by the benefits from diversity. As integration proceeds to other areas, 
after low-hanging fruits are picked, heterogeneity costs continue to increase along a convex 
curve. At some point, those high costs become politically prohibitive, and the pressure from 
spillovers, inefficiencies and crises will no longer lead to further integration, but just to 
losses, and possibly even the collapse of the whole system. The chain-reaction approach does 
not anticipate that heterogeneity costs and constraints will eventually become binding and 
stop the process for good. Followers of this approach are therefore prone to setting up 
incomplete and inefficient arrangements, relying on the overoptimistic expectation that such 
inefficiencies can always be addressed at a later stage through additional integration.  
For these reasons, there is no guarantee that regional integration in economic areas, such as a 
common market, should lead to political unification down the road. The example of the 
German customs union (Zollverein) in the nineteenth century, often mentioned in this 
respect, is misleading, because the main force behind commercial integration was political 
integration pushed by Prussia’s military power (Gilpin 2001). In fact, international 
cooperation and political unification can be viewed as substitute ways to lower barriers to 
trade.  If two regions can already agree to reduce their trade barriers with each other while 
remaining independent, they are going to obtain smaller additional gains from trade if they 
also form a political union with a unified domestic market. Empirically, this direct negative 
effect of economic integration on the incentives to form a political union is likely to be larger 
than possible indirect effects of economic integration on the costs of political integration, 
such as those stressed by Monnet and his followers (for example, a possible reduction of 
communication and coordination costs). The historical record up to now indeed suggests that 
international economic integration is more likely to go hand in hand with political 
disintegration (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003; Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg 2000).   
The euro is a child of the functionalist method. The method of partial integration provided 
the institutional framework and rationale for monetary integration. Without Monnet’s idea of 
delegating specific policy functions and prerogatives to supranational institutions, the euro 
would not have come into existence. Of course this does not mean that the euro was created 
exclusively for “functionalist” reasons and goals, or that the decision-makers were only 
supranational civil servants and elites. There would be no euro without the actions of 
powerful national politicians pursuing their own geopolitical and domestic objectives or 
without the backing of powerful economic interests (like German exporters).  However, 
statesmen with political goals and producers with economic interests exist elsewhere, but do 
not end up with a “currency without a state.” Such a currency was only possible — 
politically, technically, and intellectually — in the exceptional institutional framework 
provided by European integration.  
16 
 
By creating the euro, the chain reaction crossed the border between “pure” economic 
integration which can be achieved through international cooperation, in the form of 
liberalization of trade and capital flows, and the form of monetary integration that, 
historically, had only been obtained by a sovereign state using its power of coercion to 
establish one currency within its borders.  
The exceptional nature of the euro does not mean that Europe’s monetary union is 
unsustainable in the long run, or only sustainable if Europe becomes a sovereign federation. 
The parameters of the questions have been well stated by Mario Draghi (2012), the head of 
the European Central Bank, who said that “those who claim only a full federation can be 
sustainable set the bar too high.” Instead, Draghi focuses on the “minimum requirements to 
complete economic and monetary union.” In such framework, the future of the euro depends 
on a key political variable: the heterogeneity costs associated with the minimum set of 
functions that must be pooled or delegated for a currency union to work.  
If heterogeneity costs were small, the euro area crisis of the last few years could perhaps be 
addressed with deep fiscal and political integration. This outcome seems out of reach at 
present given the historical experience of European integration. In principle, monetary union 
could lead to a fiscal and political union even if heterogeneity remains high, if the costs from 
leaving the euro are even higher, and fiscal and political integration are perceived by national 
governments and voters as the only solution.  That outcome could be seen as a vindication of 
the darker version of Monnet’s chain reaction: heterogeneous Europeans would have been 
“trapped” in a fiscal and political union because they took an irreversible decision to enter a 
monetary union without anticipating the spillover to further integration. However, political 
union on those grounds would hardly be a solid start for a European federation; it would be 
very unlikely that such political union could trigger the positive cultural changes that would 
be the only sustainable foundation for a cohesive federation in the long run. 
 
A more promising way to ensure the stability of monetary union in Europe is to focus on a 
narrower set of minimum requirements, as suggested by Draghi (2012). High priority is 
likely to be given to banking and financial integration. Those gains could in part be secured 
with tools and institutions similar to those already profitably employed in areas where the 
European Union has been most successful, like commercial integration, antitrust regulation, 
and the formation of a single market (for instance, Enderlein et al. 2012). At the same time, 
though, the close links between banks and sovereign states in Europe can create dangerous 
spillovers, crises, and clashes between supranational authorities and national governments.  
Back Where We Started: The Benefits from European Integration  
European integration in the aftermath of World War II started to counteract war and 
protectionism. We saw the timid beginnings with coal and steel, the defeat of the ambitious 
17 
 
plan to pool defense, the establishment of a common market, and the building of ever more 
complex and ambitious supranational institutions—eventually including monetary union. We 
discussed the serious problems with the expectation that this would necessarily be a chain 
reaction towards ever closer political integration. Now, it is time to offer a few final 
comments on the sources of strengths of the European integration project.    
 
While the chain-reaction method can be carried too far, key aspects of Monnet’s strategy 
have in fact contributed to the concrete successes of the European project, when the tools of 
integration have been applied to the appropriate areas: those with lower heterogeneity costs 
and higher economies of scale. These aspects include: partial integration with a focus on 
economic areas; deep “institutionalization,” with the delegation of substantial prerogatives to 
supranational institutions, going well beyond the institutional framework of more traditional 
international organization; and integration of several functions, creating useful “linkages.” 
 
Trade integration is a good example of the effectiveness of partial integration in economic 
areas. Trade is an area where costs of heterogeneity are offset by benefits from heterogeneity 
and large economies of scale. The removal of trade barriers was in the general interest of 
Europeans, even though specific sectors and groups within each country benefited from 
protectionist policies. European supranational institutions provided a way to coordinate trade 
liberalization and to lock in the commitment not to raise barriers unilaterally when faced with 
domestic political pressure. In this respect, European integration was one of the earliest and 
most successful examples of regional arrangements set up to solve coordination problems 
and to provide credible commitments (Eichengreen 2006). Partial institutional integration in 
different areas also allowed “linkages” between issues and provision of credible side-
payments to potential losers from commercial integration. For instance, the notoriously 
wasteful Common Agricultural Policy has been often explained as a political compromise 
between France and Germany: German manufacturers gained access to the French market, 
and German taxpayers helped subsidize French farmers. 
 
Trade integration within Europe has also benefited peace and security.  The view that 
international trade can reduce the risk of war goes back to Montesquieu and Kant, and has 
spurred a large empirical literature. Multilateral openness (or “globalization”) does not 
reduce the risk of war between pairs of countries. However, bilateral trade, by increasing the 
opportunity cost of conflicts between two partners, reduces the probability of conflict 
between that pair of countries (Martin, Mayer and Thoenig 2008), even when controlling for 
historical, linguistic and cultural similarities between populations (Spolaore and Wacziarg 
2012). In fact, Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2010) find that country pairs with a high 
frequency of old wars are more likely to sign regional trade agreements, which can be 
explained as a consequence of the complementarity between economic and political gains 
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from trade. They also show that multilateral trade openness reduces the opportunity cost of 
bilateral conflict, thereby increasing the risk of war between pairs of countries which can 
trade with third partners. Therefore, globalization also increases the political incentive to sign 
regional agreements for security reasons. 
 
This interaction between economic and political factors can explain important aspects of 
European integration. For instance, it can shed light on why Konrad Adenauer, the 
Chancellor of West Germany from 1949 to 1963, pushed for a geographically narrower but 
institutionally deeper customs union with France, Germany’s old enemy, therefore reducing 
the risk of war between the two countries. Adenauer overruled his economic minister Ludwig 
Erhard, who was primarily interested in economic benefits and would have preferred a 
broader free-trade area, which France would have been unlikely to join given its own 
commercial and political interests (Garton Ash 1993; Moravcsik 1998). 
 
An open question is whether European integration has played a central or only a marginal 
role in securing peace in Europe. Skeptics of the “pacifying” effect of European institutions 
stress the crucial involvement of the United States and NATO in Europe during the Cold 
War and afterwards, and the Europeans’ failure to deal with the breakup of Yugoslavia on 
their own. Moreover, peace has also held between Japan, the other loser of World War II, 
and its neighbors, and trade has prospered among them in the absence of Asian institutions 
analogous to the European Union. However, the Cold War ended in Europe with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, Germany is now unified, and European institutions have played a very 
significant role in the process of democratization and integration of Eastern and Central 
Europe. In contrast, the relation between a still formally communist China and Taiwan 
remains tense and unresolved, and Korea is still divided and even at risk of a nuclear war, 
which could spread to Japan and other neighboring countries. On balance, whether because 
of European integration or other factors, in recent decades Europe has fared quite well in 
terms of peace and democracy relative to other areas of the world 
 
In general, pooling and delegating functions and policies to supranational institutions to take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope, while maintaining other prerogatives at the 
national (or sub-national) level, has brought substantial benefits to Europeans when 
appropriately implemented in areas with relatively low heterogeneity costs. Those benefits 
have been obtained while keeping ultimate sovereign control and the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of coercion at the national state level. A centralized European authority could 
provide a broader range of public goods with large economies of scale and scope, while 
using coercion to prevent free riding. But that would come with much higher heterogeneity 
costs. Europeans have probably been wise not to travel all the way to a sovereign federation 
so far, given their existing differences in preferences and cultures. If those preferences 
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change, Europe may benefit from a reorganization in a federal direction, but of course that 
should be decided only through broad and democratically expressed consensus.  
 
At the moment, Europeans are sticking to the current system of cooperation among sovereign 
states within a supranational organization. Within those boundaries, and in spite of the 
serious limitations that we discussed, European institutions have provided useful 
commitments to overcome some (but not all) problems from free riding and beggar-thy-
neighbor policies. European cooperation has at least turned out better than the alternative 
system of destructive unilateral national policies plaguing European history until 1945. In 
this respect, Moravcsik (2012), a leading “intergovernmentalist” scholar of European 
Integration, is hopefully not far from the truth when he writes: “Whatever the outcome of the 
crisis, the EU will remain without rival the most ambitious and successful example of 
voluntary international cooperation in world history.” 
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